A Subsidy That is Inversely Related to the Product Price
研究了一种新型补贴设计，补贴金额与产品价格反向相关，相比固定补贴能减少生产商的市场力量和补贴收益，提高政府支出成本效益（模拟显示最高提升50%），并可通过调整参数灵活调节效果，还可修改为对高质量产品提供更多补贴。
Abstract This study considers a new subsidy design to support the purchase or production of target products. Under the proposed design, subsidy payments are inversely related to product prices. Compared to ‘flat’ subsidies, this design reduces producers’ market power and the subsidy benefits passed on to them, improving the cost-effectiveness of government spending (by up to 50% according to simulations based on an actual subsidy programme). Additionally, this subsidy’s cost-effectiveness and incidence can be adjusted flexibly by changing the policy parameters. Finally, the subsidy design can be modified to provide larger payments to higher-quality products, thereby offsetting disincentives for quality improvement.