Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
研究了不完全信息下具有非线性成本函数的全支付拍卖，发现当补贴资源或边际税率较小时，同时使用两种补贴或税收能提高设计者的期望收益。
We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information with n contestants who have non-linear cost functions. The designer may award two kinds of subsidy (taxation): one that decreases (increases) each contestant's marginal cost of effort and another that increases (decreases) each contestant's value of winning. The designer's expected payoff is the contestants' expected total effort minus the cost of subsidy or, alternatively, plus the tax payment. We show that when the resource of subsidy (the marginal taxation rate) is relatively small and the cost function is concave (convex), the designer's expected payoff in all-pay auctions with both kinds of subsidy (taxation) is higher than in the same contest without any subsidy (taxation).