Information quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab
通过实验室实验，检验了在政权更迭的全局博弈中信息质量的影响，发现更分散的信息反而使被试更谨慎、增加政权稳定性，这与均衡理论预测相反，而层级k思维模型能解释这一现象。
We experimentally test the effects of information quality in a global game of regime change. The game features a payoff structure such that more dispersed private information induces agents to attack more often and reduces regime stability in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We show that subjects in the lab do not play as predicted by equilibrium theory. Instead, more dispersed information makes subjects more cautious, increasing regime stability. We show that this finding is consistent with a modified global game model in which agents engage in level-k thinking. In the level-k model, information quality affects agents’ actions through a novel channel, that enables a strategic attenuation effect. As information quality worsens, strategic complementarities between different level-k types weaken, generating a force that is capable of reversing the comparative statics from the equilibrium model.