Jobs for Sale: Corruption and Misallocation in Hiring
利用原始数据研究卫生官僚体系中的腐败招聘，发现贿赂者平均支付17个月工资，但其质量与择优录用者相当，且服务效果取决于申请者财富与能力的相关性。
Corrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. This paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt hiring in a health bureaucracy. Hires pay bribes averaging 17 months of salary, but contrary to conventional wisdom, their observable quality is comparable to counterfactual merit-based hires. Exploiting variation across jobs, I show that the consequences of corrupt allocations depend on the correlation between wealth and quality among applicants: service delivery outcomes are good for jobs where this was positive and poor when negative. In this setting, the correlation was typically positive, leading to relatively good performance of hires.