Entry and exit decisions under public and private information: an experiment
通过实验研究公共和私人信息披露政策如何影响可逆的市场进入决策，发现私人信息下进入率更高，表明被试重视信息并愿意探索。
Abstract We design an experiment to study how reversible entry decisions are affected by public and private payoff disclosure policies. In our environment, subjects choose between a risky payoff, which evolves according to an autoregressive process, and a constant payoff. The treatments vary the information disclosure rule on the risky payoff, such that in the public information treatment the risky payoff is always observable, while in the private information treatment, the risky payoff is observable only to the participants who enter the market. We find that under private information, market entry is higher, which suggests that subjects engage in exploration and place value on information.