Industry centrality: Weak ties, industry attributes, and managerial contracting
研究了行业在贸易网络中的中心性如何影响行业的经济属性（如创新、竞争）以及CEO的薪酬和激励契约，发现中心性越高的行业创新越少、竞争越激烈、CEO薪酬和激励越弱。
Abstract Centrality in the network of interindustry trade relationships provides novel insights into an industry's economic attributes and managerial incentive contracts prevalent in the industry. More “central” industries trade with a large number of industries, implying numerous but relatively weaker interindustry ties. Weakness of interindustry ties suggests that relationship‐specific investment (RSI) will be less important and output will be relatively more commoditized in central industries. As predicted, central industry firms are less innovative, face greater competition, and have lower idiosyncratic risk. Further, CEOs in central industries receive lower pay and weaker incentives. Tournament incentives are also weaker in more central industries.