Institutional Blockholders and Voluntary Disclosure
研究发现机构大股东持股集中会减少公司自愿披露信息，原因是大股东可通过私下渠道获取信息，且被动型大股东对公开披露需求低。
We study how institutional blockholdings affect firm voluntary disclosure. We document that concentrated institutional ownership reduces firms’ voluntary disclosure measured by the propensity to issue management forecasts, comprehensiveness of guidance, propensity to engage in conference calls, and the number of 8-K filings. We identify two channels through which blockholders affect firms’ voluntary disclosure. First, blockholders have easier access to managers and substitute private for public information acquisition. Second, a higher proportion of non-monitoring blockholders with low demand for voluntary disclosure, such as passive blockholders, reduces the firm’s incentive to provide voluntary disclosure. The results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. Our study identifies an important effect that concentrated ownership has on firm corporate disclosure.