The Golden Mean: The Risk‐Mitigating Effect of Combining Tournament Rewards with High‐Powered Incentives
研究了金融经理同时面临相对绩效奖励（如基金排名）和绝对绩效奖励（如奖金）时，这两种奖励如何相互抑制对方的冒险激励，并提出了新的预测。
ABSTRACT The rewards received by financial managers depend on both relative performance (e.g., fund inflows based on fund rankings, promotions based on peer comparisons) and absolute performance (e.g., bonus payments for meeting accounting targets, hedge‐fund incentive fees). Both relative and absolute performance rewards engender risk‐taking. In this paper, we show that these two sources of risk‐taking, relative and absolute performance rewards, mitigate the risk‐taking incentives produced by the other. This mutual incentive‐reduction effect generates a number of novel predictions about the relationship of managerial risk‐taking with the structure of relative and absolute performance rewards.