Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention
研究美国众议院议员在媒体关注度低时是否更偏向特殊利益集团而非选民，发现议员收到的利益集团捐款越多，越可能投票反对选民偏好，且这种效应在自然灾害等事件分散注意力时更显著。
Abstract We investigate whether US House representatives favour special interest groups over constituents in periods of low media attention to politics. Analysing 666 roll calls from 2005 to 2018, we show that representatives are more likely to vote against their constituency’s preferred position the more special interest money they receive from groups favouring the opposite position. The latter effect is significantly larger when less attention is paid to politics due to distraction by exogenous newsworthy events like natural disasters. The effect is mostly driven by short-term opportunistic behaviour than the short-term scheduling of controversial votes in periods with high news pressure.