Financial Statement Disaggregation and Auditor Effort
研究了公司财务报表分解程度对审计师努力（以审计费用衡量）的影响，发现分解程度越高，审计费用越高，且这种效应通过审计师对较小项目重要性评估的变化实现，同时分解能约束管理者操纵盈余。
SUMMARY We examine the consequences of firms' disaggregation choices for auditor effort and audited financial statements. We document a significant positive association between disaggregation and audit fees, our proxy for auditor effort. Using separate measures of disaggregation of smaller line items versus larger, obviously material, line items, we provide evidence that one of the avenues through which disaggregation may increase auditor effort is through changes in auditors' assessments of materiality for smaller line items, especially when financial statement scrutiny is high. We also find disaggregation (and the audit fees associated with disaggregation) constrain the ability of managers to manipulate earnings in the audited financial statements compared to the unaudited financial statements, suggesting the fee response to disaggregation is due to auditor effort. Last, we provide evidence that our results are not fully explained by client litigation risk or other client attributes driving disaggregation choices. JEL Classifications: M41; M42.