The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
研究发现，在长期雇佣关系中，不可观测的随机冲击对效率的负面影响远小于短期关系，这得益于重复博弈效应和噪声抵消效应的共同作用。
Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.