Mixed‐signal stock splits
研究了CEO在内幕卖出股票的同时进行股票拆分的行为，发现这种混合信号拆分后公司表现更差，异常回报更低，且更可能发生盈余重述和CEO更替。
Abstract We investigate CEOs who combine insider selling with stock splits, which is suspicious, because dumping stocks is inconsistent with the positive stock‐split signal. Our empirical results indicate that, compared with other splits, these mixed‐signal splits perform poorly and are followed by much lower buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns and much higher likelihoods of announcing an earnings restatement and CEO turnover in the post‐split period. Our results are robust to entropy balancing and controlling for CEO characteristics, incentives, and corporate governance and highlight previously ignored agency issues around stock splits. Attention to insider trades is essential to properly interpret a stock‐split signal.