Trust and Insurance Contracts
利用跨国保险公司28个子公司的房屋保险索赔数据，构建了一个允许消费者虚假索赔和公司拒绝合理索赔的保险模型，检验了信任和诚实对保险合同、纠纷和赔付的影响，发现信任是保险市场的核心。
Abstract We assemble homeowner insurance claims from 28 independently operated country subsidiaries of a multinational insurance firm. We propose a new insurance model, in which consumers can make invalid claims and firms can deny valid claims, as is common in the data. In the model, trust and honesty shape equilibrium insurance contracts, disputes, and claim payments, especially when disputes are too small for courts. We test the model by investigating claim incidence, dispute, rejection, and payment, as well as insurance costs and pricing across countries. The evidence is consistent with the centrality of trust for insurance markets, as our model predicts. Authors have furnished data/code, which are available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.