Financial Market Manipulation, Whistleblowing, and the Common Good: Evidence from theLIBORScandal
研究了LIBOR丑闻中金融机构和个人操纵基准利率的行为，指出自上而下的监管执法难以有效防范市场滥用，提出基于个人责任和共同利益的自下而上方法可能更有效。
The LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) scandal, which led to the prosecution of both financial institutions and individuals for manipulating the primary interest rate benchmark in global financial markets, shows that the current top‐down approaches to regulatory rule enforcement cannot prevent or adequately detect financial market abuse. We argue that a bottom‐up approach, which relies on individuals acting in the interest of the common good, may be more effective in organizational environments that are duty‐ as well as incentive‐based. This approach encourages individuals to accept a degree of moral responsibility for their actions, and to some extent for the actions of others. We argue that properly motivated and instructed individuals can think and act better than they might otherwise do, despite behavioural biases. Nonetheless, there are circumstances under which the prevention of market manipulation may not ultimately serve the common good.