Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design
研究了在最优合同设计中引入中期绩效评估的利弊，发现客观指标下可无损失地使用评估结果，但主观指标下不评估可能更有利。
This paper examines the desirability of having an interim performance evaluation (IPE) in the design of an optimal contract. While enabling the principal to plan and control the project process better, the IPE may also adversely affect the agent’s morale in case of unfavorable IPE outcome. Despite this, we show that it is without loss of generality using contracts that tailor effort or payment to the IPE result when it involves objective measures. In the environment in which it involves subjective measures, not using IPE may be in the principal’s interest; the reason is that the contract now features a progressive payment scheme that renders extra costs upon information disclosure.