Private Benefits, Public Vices: Railways and Logrolling in the Nineteenth-Century British Parliament
研究利用19世纪40年代英国铁路狂热时期议会投票规则，识别出议员间互投赞成票（logrolling）行为，发现其导致近四分之一的铁路法案获批，并对社会造成相当于当时GDP 1/3至1%的负外部性。
Vote trading among lawmakers (logrolling) can enable political rent-seeking but is difficult to identify. To achieve identification, we explore the rules governing voting for railway projects in the U.K. Parliament during the Railway Mania of the 1840s. Parliamentary rules barred MPs from voting directly for their interests. Even so, they could trade votes to ensure their interests prevailed. We find that logrolling was significant, accounting for nearly one-quarter of the railway bills approved. We also quantify a negative externality to society from logrolling ranging from 1/3 to 1 percent of contemporary GDP.