Poisson voting games under proportional rule
研究了比例规则下两党制中的策略投票，将基本空间模型嵌入人口不确定性的泊松框架，证明了唯一纳什均衡的存在性及其特征，并分析了均衡随预期选民数增加而收敛的性质。
Abstract We analyze strategic voting under proportional rule and two parties, embedding the basic spatial model into the Poisson framework of population uncertainty. We prove that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We show that it is characterized by a cutpoint in the policy space that is always located between the average of the two parties’ positions and the median of the distribution of voters’ types. We also show that, as the expected number of voters goes to infinity, the equilibrium converges to that of the case with deterministic population size.