R&D investment decisions in business groups: Evidence from a natural experiment
利用韩国垄断规制与公平交易法对集团关联企业股权投资的限制，研究发现控制性所有者更倾向于在受该法规约束较大的企业中增加长期研发支出，且这一效应在所有者现金流权低、位于金字塔底层及持股较少的公司中更显著。
Abstract Research Question/Issue This paper examines R&D investment decisions in firms under a pyramidal ownership structure in the context of South Korea. Research Findings/Insights Using the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, which places limits on group affiliates' equity investments, we provide new evidence that controlling owners tend to increase long‐term R&D expenditures more in firms that are largely subject to the equity investment regulation in South Korea. Moreover, this result is more significant for firms for which the owners have low cash‐flow rights, firms located in the lower layers of the pyramid, and firms that hold less equity shares than do other group affiliates. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study contributes to the literature that focuses on R&D investment decisions by providing empirical support regarding how firms' relative status within their business group influences the firms' R&D investment decisions in South Korea. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides important insight into the positive policy implications of the equity investment regulation on R&D investments for Korean business groups.