Agenda Manipulation under Doctrinal Paradox
研究议程设定者如何通过选择投票议题来操纵集体决策结果，提出一种在民主公理下优于所有其他程序的议程操纵策略。
A group of individuals faces a multi-valued proposition whose truth-value is logically driven from many preliminary propositions. An agenda-setter aims at manipulating the voting outcome by choosing which propositions to ask the group. The strategies of the agenda-setter are formally defined as a class of aggregation procedures that satisfy our democratic axiom. Within this class, we characterize a novel aggregation procedure that uniformly dominates all other procedures in the sense that the outcome of this procedure is always greater than the outcomes of any other procedures, regardless of how voters cast their ballots. Conversely, the mathematical dual of this procedure is uniformly dominated by all other procedures. These results clarify to what extent an agenda-setter can unambiguously manipulate the voting outcome before opening a ballot box.