Strategic underleveraging and acquisitions
验证了Morellec和Zhdanov（2008）的预测：企业为了赢得收购竞争会战略性地降低杠杆，且这一行为受竞争程度、协同效应、投资类型和行业集中度等因素影响。
This paper investigates the Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) (MZ) prediction that firms strategically underleverage to win takeover contests. We document support for several specific MZ model predictions: pre-bid underleveraging increases with bidding competition, synergies offered by targets, investment type, industry concentration, and with firms actively adjusting their capital structure in advance of bidding. An empirically verified financial frictions explanation does not fully account for these patterns. Taken together, we find consistent evidence that strategic underleveraging conditional on the acquisition outlook is an important determinant of capital structure dynamics.