Charitable giving and intermediation: a principal agent problem with hidden prices
研究了慈善中介机构从捐赠中自筹资金导致捐赠者无法知晓最终受益比例的问题，发现捐赠者虽因中介和预期价格上升而减少捐赠，但伦理偏好会部分或完全补偿，使慈善产出可能成为吉芬商品。
Abstract Donations are often made through charitable intermediaries that can fund themselves from these same donations. After intermediation, only a fraction of the amount donated may reach the intended beneficiary. The price of charitable output is therefore higher after intermediation than if donors donated directly toward the end cause. At the same time, this price is hidden from donors since they cannot verify how much intermediaries pass on. We show that while donors reduce their donation in intermediation itself, and also reduce their donation because they expect the price of charitable output to increase, both reactions are either fully or partly compensated by their ethical preferences for the recipient’s rights. Charitable output, therefore, can be a Giffen-good.