Optimal income taxation under monopolistic competition
研究了内生市场结构与税收政策的相互依赖，在垄断竞争框架下扩展了Mirrlees所得税模型，发现市场结构导致的扭曲需要调整所得税并辅以商品税或企业税，忽略市场结构会造成1.77%的福利损失。
This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 38:175-208, 1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that quantity and variety distortions resulting from the market structure require adjustments to income tax policy, which also needs to be complemented with commodity or firm taxation to achieve the constrained social optimum. We calibrate the model and find that in policy design the failure to account for the market structure results in a welfare loss of 1.77%. Motivated by practical cases, we study a policy regime that is solely based on income taxation. We show that departures from the social optimum can be compensated by lower and less regressive income taxes and a smaller government compared to the regime with income and commodity taxes. We also examine the role of consumer preferences for policy outcomes and show that it is substantially amplified by an endogenous market structure.