The implications of finite‐order reasoning
研究了理性与m阶强信念理性（R(m-1)SBR）在各类类型结构中的行为特征，提出m-最佳反应序列概念，并用于解释重复囚徒困境和蜈蚣博弈的实验数据。
The epistemic conditions of rationality and m th‐order strong belief of rationality (R m SBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward‐induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with R m SBR across all type structures. In particular, in a class of generic games, R( m − 1)SBR is characterized by a new solution concept we call an m ‐best response sequence ( m ‐BRS). Such sequences are an iterative version of extensive‐form best response sets (Battigalli and Friedenberg, 2012). The strategies that survive m rounds of extensive‐form rationalizability are consistent with an m ‐BRS, but there are m ‐BRS's that are disjoint from the former set. As such, there is behavior that is consistent with R( m − 1)SBR but inconsistent with m rounds of extensive‐form rationalizability. We use our characterization to draw implications for the interpretation of experimental data. Specifically, we show that the implications are nontrivial in the three‐repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Centipede games.