Crowding in School Choice
研究了学生与学校匹配中存在的拥挤效应，提出新框架和均衡概念，该均衡具有学生最优元素，可激励相容并通过新算法实现，且保留了匹配理论的基本结构结果。
We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents’ decision-making and the empirical literature; however, they cause difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive-compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature (the rural hospitals theorem, welfare lattice, etc.) survive.