Optimal capital structure and simultaneous bankruptcy of firms in corporate networks
研究了低盈利企业破产对高盈利企业的负面溢出效应，发现高盈利企业可能选择增加杠杆与低盈利企业同时破产，以获取税收优惠，解释了企业网络中的破产连锁和财务政策羊群行为。
We examine two firms’ strategic choices of capital structure in the presence of negative bankruptcy spillovers. The low-profitability firm (denoted by firm L) that bankrupts earlier affects the high-profitability firm (denoted by firm H). Against negative bankruptcy spillovers, firm H takes either of the two contrasting responses: decreasing leverage to prepare for operations after firm L’s bankruptcy or increasing leverage to bankrupt simultaneously with firm L. Firm H prefers simultaneous bankruptcy when the tax benefits of increased debt dominate the cash flows from operations after firm L’s bankruptcy. With more negative bankruptcy spillovers, a smaller profitability difference, and lower volatility, firm H is more likely to choose simultaneous bankruptcy. The simultaneous bankruptcy equilibrium shows a novel mechanism in which firms’ strategic capital structure choices cause simultaneous bankruptcy of firms in corporate networks. This mechanism can explain empirical findings of chains of bankruptcies and herding behavior for corporate financial policies in corporate networks.