Non‐Deal Roadshows, Informed Trading, and Analyst Conflicts of Interest
研究发现非交易路演期间本地机构投资者交易活跃且获利，而散户交易信息含量低；主办分析师为争取业务会发布更乐观的评级和可被轻易达到的盈利预测，揭示机构信息优势与分析师利益冲突。
ABSTRACT Non‐deal roadshows (NDRs) are private meetings between management and institutional investors, typically organized by sell‐side analysts. We find that around NDRs, local institutional investors trade heavily and profitably, while retail trading is significantly less informed. Analysts who sponsor NDRs issue significantly more optimistic recommendations and target prices, together with more “beatable” earnings forecasts, consistent with analysts issuing strategically biased forecasts to win NDR business. Our results suggest that NDRs result in a substantial information advantage for institutional investors and create significant conflicts of interests for the analysts who organize them.