Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
研究了外部压力下序贯投票与同时投票的优劣，理论表明序贯投票能保证真正多数结果，但实验发现参与者行为偏离均衡，未能显著提升多数结果。
Abstract When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.