Noncompete Agreements, Wages and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence from Brazilian Football
利用巴西1998年《佩莱法案》禁止足球行业竞业禁止协议的政策变化，研究其对劳动力市场的影响，发现该法案降低了年轻球员工资、提高了老将工资，并略微增加了球员流动，通过结构模型估计表明效率提升被分配效应所抵消。
Abstract The Pele Act banned noncompete agreements in Brazilian football in 1998. We explore this policy change to study how noncompetes affect the labor market. The Act changed the wage profile heterogeneously, reducing young players’ wages and raising salaries for older ones. Turnover increased slightly. We develop and structurally estimate a model and show that changing the parameter capturing the noncompete friction leads to the changes observed in the data. From the estimation, we recover match efficiency before and after the Act and show that efficiency gains are outweighed by distributional effects.