为他人赢取收益时的性别与竞争性:来自实验的证据及其对赞助的启示

Gender and competitiveness when earning for others: Experimental evidence and implications for sponsorship

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2021
被引 10
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

通过实验研究,发现当竞争奖励归于被赞助者时,女性管理者的竞争性提升至与男性相当,但男性管理者更愿为男性被赞助者竞争;了解被赞助者风险偏好可消除此性别差距。

Abstract

Abstract Research Summary Career paths depend not only on individuals' own competitiveness but also on the competitiveness of others in a position to advocate for them. In this article, we study competitiveness when rewards accrue to another individual. In particular, we ask how female and male managers' competitiveness changes when rewards from competition accrue to their female or male protégés, relative to when they accrue to themselves. Using an experimental approach, we find that when rewards accrue to protégés, male and female managers are equally competitive because female managers increase their competitiveness. However, male managers compete more for male rather than female protégés. This gap disappears when male managers know their protégés' risk preferences, suggesting a novel intervention to ensure equity in the sponsorship process. Managerial Summary Sponsorship is key to individuals' career development and firms' human capital strategy. In this experimental study simulating an organizational setting, we investigate one aspect of sponsorship and ask whether managers' and protégés' genders affect managers' willingness to compete on behalf of their protégés. We find that when the rewards from competition accrue to protégés, female managers increase their competitiveness and eliminate the gender competitiveness gap present when rewards accrue to managers themselves. This suggests that, from a competitiveness standpoint, female and male managers are equally strong sponsors. However, male managers compete more for male, relative to female, protégés. This gap disappears when male managers have information about protégés' risks preferences, suggesting a novel approach that organizations can implement to reduce discrimination in sponsorship.

组织行为性别差异竞争行为赞助实验经济学