Information Asymmetry, Financial Intermediation, and Wealth Effects of Project Finance Loans
利用手工收集的样本，研究矿业开发商宣布项目融资贷款时的市场反应，发现贷款批准后三天内异常回报率为2.6%，异常买卖价差降低3.4%，表明私人贷款人向股权持有者传递信息并减少信息不对称。
Abstract Using a unique hand-collected sample, we study market reactions to mining developers announcing project finance loans. We document a significant three-day abnormal return of 2.6% and a 3.4% reduction in abnormal bid-ask spread around loan approvals, consistent with information transfer from private lenders to equity holders and reduction in asymmetric information. Cross-sectional analysis reveals a negative association between announcement return and hedging requirements specified in loan contracts, which becomes insignificant after controlling for treatment effects of hedging. Specialist banks do not charge lower rates but are more likely to impose hedging requirements, consistent with rent extraction due to bargaining power.