Corruption in social relations: Bribe‐taking, corruptibility, and corruption risks
通过1400名受试者的随机实验，研究了单次与重复互动、陌生人与弱关系对受贿倾向和腐败风险的影响，发现重复互动增加受贿金额但提高举报和审计风险，弱关系则抑制受贿意愿。
Abstract This inquiry aims to investigate how the relational dynamics are imprinted on two critical dimensions of bribe‐taking: corruptibility and corruption risks. Two treatments were randomly administered to 1400 subjects: single versus repeated interactions and strangers versus weak ties. The findings suggest that repeated interactions induce bigger bribe sizes, but also increase risks from whistleblowing and internal auditing. Weak ties mitigate bribe‐taking willingness. Nevertheless, when coupled with repeated interactions, weak ties suppress the risks from whistleblowing, testifying the bifurcated effects. The tensions between corruptibility and corruption risks suggest that bribe‐taking decisions are fraught with internal tensions, with the overall effects likely being a priori determined only in specific contexts. Such tensions are more intensified among true bureaucrats as they tend to claim bigger bribes and report more risks from internal auditing.