Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies
分析了耐用品技术的最优补贴设计，发现政策制定者面临随时间递增或递减补贴的权衡，并以加州住宅太阳能为例，证明有效补贴应随时间递增，且当家庭预期技术进步和未来补贴时，监管支出增加四倍。
We analyze the efficient subsidy for durable good technologies. We theoretically demonstrate that a policy maker faces a tension between intertemporally price discriminating by designing a subsidy that increases over time and taking advantage of future technological progress by designing a subsidy that decreases over time. Using dynamic estimates of household preferences for residential solar in California, we show that the efficient subsidy increases over time. The regulator’s spending quintuples when households anticipate future technological progress and future subsidies.