Dynamic optimal restructuring policies under debt renegotiation with positive externalities
用纳什讨价还价模型构建了具有正外部性的债务重新谈判模型，研究了财务困境下的动态最优债务重组政策，推导出最优重组政策的闭式解，并解释了绝对优先规则的违反现象。
Abstract This paper develops a debt renegotiation model with positive externalities using the Nash bargaining game and explores dynamic optimal downward debt restructuring policies in times of financial distress. We derive closed‐form expressions for the optimal restructuring policies. Moreover, we provide theoretical support for the advantages of debt renegotiation with positive externalities. In addition, our model could explain the violation of the absolute priority rule for firms in financial distress. Finally, we find that debt renegotiation is facilitated among firms with relatively low risk and a high leverage ratio, as documented by empirical evidence.