Optimal Financial Exclusion
研究在包含外生和策略性违约的信用模型中，如何设计最优的排斥政策以最大化社会福利，发现前置排斥能提高稳态下有价值交易的总量并改善被排斥者的平均福利。
We study efficient exclusion policies in a canonical credit model that features both exogenous and strategic default along the equilibrium path. Policies that maximize welfare in a stationary equilibrium implement exclusion for a finite and deterministic number of periods following default. Front-loading exclusion makes the mass of socially valuable transactions as high as it can be in steady state. Less intuitively, doing so also maximizes the average welfare of excluded agents in equilibrium conditional on the level of incentives provided by the threat of exclusion. We argue that these results are robust to a host of natural variations on our benchmark model.