CEO Turnover and the Engagement Quality Reviewer’s Audit Effort
利用韩国独特数据集，实证发现CEO更替（审计风险代理变量）与项目质量复核工时正相关，且在向上盈余管理和强制CEO更替时更显著，为审计质量控制的讨论提供经验证据。
Previous literature on the engagement quality (EQ) review argues that EQ reviewers should provide more efforts into the review process when fieldwork auditors’ judgments and conclusions on the financial statements are potentially biased. Little empirical study has been done, however, partly due to the confidentiality of the detailed data on EQ reviewers’ audit hours. The purpose of the article is to shed light on the existing literature by conducting an empirical investigation using a unique actual data set available in Korea. The results show that the EQ review hours are positively associated with CEO turnovers, a proxy for the audit risk, which supports the prediction of the theory on the EQ review. Additional analyses show that such results are stronger under (a) the upward earnings management and (b) the forced CEO turnover. The article extends the existing literature on the EQ review process and enhances the understanding of the engagement-level quality control in the volatile audit environment by providing empirical evidence to the analytic discussions on the EQ review.