Adversarial Patrolling in a Uniform
研究了可见（穿制服）巡逻员在博物馆、机场等场所的巡逻博弈，发现制服会显著降低拦截盗窃或攻击的效率，但可能起到威慑作用。
Many of us will have seen uniformed guards patrolling in museums, airports, and other places where thefts or attacks are possible. In other similar places, we may have been unaware of undercover agents carrying out similar patrols. The latter type of patrollers has been modeled in recent literature. However, when the patroller is visible (wears a uniform), the potential thief or terrorist may be able to spot him when he is nearby and to time his theft appropriately. For example, the thief may wait a specified time after the uniformed patroller leaves his area. In “The Uniformed Patroller Game,” Steve Alpern, Paul Chleboun, Stamatios Katsikas, and Kyle Y. Lin study the effect on the patrolling game of having a visible (uniformed) patroller. It turns out that putting a uniform on the patroller greatly reduces his effectiveness in intercepting thefts or attacks. Of course, the visibility of a uniform may act as a deterrent to having the theft take place at all.