Effective horizon management in transnational administration: Bespoke and box‐ticking consultancies in anti‐money laundering
研究反洗钱跨国行政中，富裕国家用定制化咨询主动管理政策视野，而发展中国家依赖全球专业服务公司的“打勾”咨询，反映并强化了全球权力不对称。
Abstract Efforts to combat global money laundering have established a transnational administrative regime that provides peer review mutual evaluations that are coordinated among national public administrations. Led by the Financial Action Task Force, this regime encourages compliance with anti‐money laundering (AML) standards to detect “effectiveness” in administrative capacity despite an absence of reliable data on money laundering activity. This article examines how national administrations engage different types of consultants in the preparation of mutual evaluations. I distinguish between the use of bespoke consultants who actively interpret effectiveness by wealthier countries, and “box‐ticking” consultants from global professional service firms which developing countries are more reliant on. As such, the transnational administration of AML governance and its links to consultants reflects and reinforces global power asymmetries. Wealthy countries can positively use consultants to manage their policy horizons, while developing countries are left with short‐term compliance that is not aimed at building administrative capacity.