Regulation‐induced Disclosures: Evidence of Information Overload?
研究发现，年报中监管引发的披露增加与分析师延迟增加、准确性下降和分歧加大相关，且存在倒U型关系，超过一定水平后披露增加反而降低分析师决策质量。
Researchers, regulators, and practitioners have expressed concerns that the increase in disclosures in annual reports of firms over the past decades has resulted in unintended consequences for financial statement users. We investigate whether increases in disclosure requirements are associated with increased difficulty to use financial statements. We create an index measuring firms' increasing exposure to regulation‐induced disclosures in their 10‐K filings and show that a higher index is on average associated with longer analyst delay, lower analyst accuracy, and higher dispersion. Consistent with information overload theory, we also find evidence consistent with an inverted‐U curve: As regulation‐induced disclosures increase, the decision quality of analysts initially increases. However, above a certain level of disclosures, increases in disclosures are associated with a decrease in the decision quality of analysts, as evidenced by an increase in analyst delay and dispersion and a decrease in accuracy. In addition, these adverse effects are more pronounced when analysts are less experienced, follow more firms, and have access to fewer resources. Overall, the findings suggest that increases in regulation‐induced disclosures, above a certain level, are associated with information overload.