Disciplining Role of Auditor Tenure and Mandatory Auditor Rotation
通过理论模型比较了强制轮换制度下审计师出具独立报告的激励，发现强制轮换可能反而损害审计师独立性，与普遍观点相反。
ABSTRACT This study addresses the international debate over whether the rotation of audit firms should be mandatory. Mandatory rotation rules have been adopted by the European Union, but these rules have not been established in the United States. Proponents of the policy believe that a long-tenure auditor-client relationship leads to the auditor building an excessive economic bond with the client, which may then erode auditor independence. Motivated by this claim, I build a theoretical model that compares auditor incentives to issue independent reports under regimes with and without mandatory rotation. The model demonstrates conditions under which mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor independence, contrary to the popular view.