Married CEOs and stock price crash risk
研究发现，已婚CEO管理的公司未来股价崩盘风险更低，因为婚姻抑制了坏消息囤积行为，这种效应在治理较弱或CEO知名度低、薪酬低时更明显。
Abstract This study examines whether marriage, as a social construct and cultural norm, can affect firm‐level stock price crash risk. We find that firms managed by married CEOs are associated with lower future stock price crash risk, after controlling for a set of firm characteristics and CEO traits. We document that CEO marriage reduces crash risk by curbing bad news hoarding and formation activities. Moreover, the attenuating impact of CEO marriage on crash risk is more pronounced among firms with weaker corporate governance and those run by less prominent, higher‐delta and lower‐paid CEOs.