Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration
提出了一个不完全信息讨价还价框架，分析多个买方和卖方市场中不同议价能力的影响，发现纵向一体化不一定增加社会福利，而横向并购可能通过改变议价权重来增加社会福利。
We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. We show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase social surplus. Moreover, efficient bargaining implies that in equilibrium noncontractible investments are efficient.