Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom
利用2002年英国议会规则修正案，研究发现与议员有联系的FTSE 350公司获得了更高的股票回报，因为政治接触的预期价值上升；议员更可能加入立法委员会，企业则调整董事会任命和减少政治捐款。
In 2002, an amendment to UK parliamentary regulations removed restrictions on the participation of Members of Parliament (MPs) in parliamentary proceedings related to their corporate interests. Using this amendment, we demonstrate higher equity returns for FTSE 350 firms connected to an MP due to the increase in the expected value of political access. Following the amendment, MPs with corporate connections are more likely to be members of parliamentary select and joint committees where legislative bills are drafted. They also attend more committee meetings relative to MPs without corporate connections. Firms react to the increased value of direct political access by rebalancing their political activities. We demonstrate that firms shift board appointments towards sitting MPs, away from other politicians, and reduce their political donations. The benefits of higher political access are greater for firms with family ownership and lower accounting transparency.