The role of information asymmetry in closely-held firms’ tax and financial reporting choices
研究发现紧密持股公司比广泛持股公司在同时追求税收节省和报告盈利时更不激进，这种差异主要由信息不对称驱动，对关注公司治理和税收政策的学者有参考价值。
This study examines whether and how closely-held ownership is associated with the relationship between tax and financial reporting aggressiveness. More specifically, we find that although both closely-held and widely-held firms pursue tax savings and higher reported earnings, closely-held firms are less aggressive compared to widely-held firms in pursuing both simultaneously. We argue and find evidence that this is associated with non-controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders concerned about agency costs imposed by each on the other. Furthermore, this finding is driven mainly by firms with high information asymmetry (as proxied by firm size, analyst following and board size), suggesting that information asymmetry is a channel through which closely-held ownership is associated with firms’ tax and financial reporting choices.