Opacity, liquidity and disclosure requirements
构建模型揭示资产不透明度与流动性之间的驼峰形关系：低不透明度资产流动性好，中等不透明度引发逆向选择导致流动性差，高不透明度反而提升流动性。对美国公司买卖价差的实证分析支持该关系，并指出统一披露标准可能非最优，双层标准或补贴自愿披露更有效。
Abstract We present a model that links the opacity of an asset to its liquidity. We show that while low‐opacity assets are liquid, intermediate levels of opacity provide incentives for investors to acquire private information, causing adverse selection and illiquidity. High opacity, however, benefits liquidity by reducing the value of a unit of private information. The cross‐section of bid–ask spreads of US firms is shown to be broadly consistent with this hump‐shaped relationship between opacity and illiquidity. Our analysis suggests that uniform disclosure standards may be suboptimal; efficient disclosure can instead be achieved through a two‐tier standard system or by subsidizing voluntary disclosure.