Regulatory Treatment of Changes in Fair Value and the Composition of Banks' Investment Portfolios
研究了1990年代美国小银行在可供出售债务证券公允价值变动暂时计入监管资本时，低资本银行减少高波动资产、增加低波动资产的投资行为，对评估监管豁免政策有参考价值。
ABSTRACT Following the financial crisis of 2007–2008, Basel III recommended that bank regulators include changes in the fair value of available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities in Tier 1 capital. However, the U.S. allowed smaller banks to continue excluding these changes through a one-time opt out election. This paper examines the investment decisions of smaller banks in the 1990s when changes in the fair value of AFS debt securities were temporarily included in regulatory capital. Using a sample of smaller banks and a difference-in-differences research design, we find that low-capitalized banks reduced their investments in more volatile asset classes (e.g., corporate bonds, non-agency MBS) and increased their investments in less volatile asset classes (e.g., treasuries and municipal bonds) after these changes were included. These findings suggest that providing smaller banks with an opt out election potentially allows low-capitalized, riskier banks to continue to hold more volatile securities in their AFS portfolios. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G18; G21.