Competitive location‐based and trajectory‐based mobile targeting
研究两个竞争卖家使用位置或轨迹信息定向移动消费者时的均衡选择，发现位置定向在时间成本低时更可能成为均衡，并分析其对消费者和社会福利的影响。
Abstract Advances in mobile analytics have enabled sellers to target mobile consumers using geolocation and the more granular mobile trajectory information. Using a game‐theoretical model of a context in which two competing sellers choose to target mobile consumers using location or trajectory, we examine the long‐term implications for sellers, consumers, and the social welfare. We show that mobile targeting, either location‐based or trajectory‐based, by both sellers indeed emerges as the equilibrium; however, trajectory‐based targeting need not always emerge as the equilibrium. For instance, location‐based targeting emerges as the equilibrium if the consumers’ disutility from a consumption delay (i.e., time cost) is low relative to their transportation cost. The primary driver of our findings relates to the role of location and travel direction information in exposing (or masking) the degree of consumer heterogeneity and the competitive advantage a seller has over the other in attracting a consumer.