Optimal Bank Reserve Remuneration and Capital Control Policy
研究了在银行中介外国贷款且政府可对准备金付息并实施资本管制时，无管制经济反而借贷不足，最优准备金政策是逆周期的，政府在经济收缩时充当最后贷款人。
A central prediction of open economy models with a pecuniary externality due to a collateral constraint is that the unregulated economy overborrows relative to what occurs under optimal policy. A maintained assumption in this literature is that households borrow directly from foreign lenders. This paper shows that if foreign lending is intermediated by domestic banks and the government can pay interest on bank reserves and impose capital controls, the unregulated economy underborrows. The optimal bank reserve policy is countercyclical. By increasing bank reserves during contractions, the government acts as a lender of last resort to collateral-constrained households.