Frenemies: Corporate Advertising Under Common Ownership
利用共同基金合并作为外生冲击，研究发现共同机构持股会显著降低竞争企业间的广告支出，且该效应在协调收益高或成本低时更明显。
In this paper, we investigate the impact of ownership structure on corporate advertising expenditures. Using mutual fund mergers as an exogenous shock to ownership structure, we find that competing firms owned by the same institutional blockholders experience a significant reduction in advertising expenditure. The reduction in advertising expenditure is more likely to occur in the presence of higher coordination benefits or lower coordination costs. Specifically, this effect is more pronounced for firms in more competitive industries, in higher advertising-intensity industries, with greater common ownership, with more concentrated institutional ownership, and with headquarters located in the same state. Overall, our empirical evidence indicates that ownership by common institutional investors significantly affects corporate advertising strategy. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.