How policing incentives affect crime, measurement, and justice
构建模型分析警察在调查与巡逻间的选择，并通过实验发现：对错误惩罚的严厉训诫不改变犯罪率，但提高平民收入并减少误判；而广泛使用的破案率指标可能误导绩效评估。
Abstract In this paper we develop a model where the police choose between investigating and patrolling, while civilians choose between producing and stealing. We derive a truth table for the equilibrium numbers of criminals and producers, punished or not, that can holistically evaluate the effects of police performance incentives. To test the model, we conduct an experiment that varies how severely an officer is reprimanded for false punishments. We find that stronger reprimands do not change crime, increase civilian incomes, and decrease false positives. We also find that the clearance rate, a measure of performance used widely in econometric studies, suggests police performance is better when it is unambiguously worse.