Dynamics of managerial power and CEO compensation in the course of corporate distress: Evidence from 1992 to 2019
研究了1992-2019年间陷入困境的企业中管理层对董事会的影响力和CEO薪酬的变化，发现困境企业会减少管理层在董事会的任职、降低CEO薪酬、加强激励一致性并提高CEO更替率，薪酬变化主要来自绩效相关部分。
Abstract We study the dynamics of two governance constructs, managerial influence over the board of directors and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, in firms undergoing distress during 1992–2019. Data show a clear trend that governance improves over time, which confounds the inference about the effects of distress on governance. Controlling for the secular changes with a bias‐corrected matching estimator, we find that distressed firms reduce managerial board appointments and CEO pay, intensify managerial incentive alignment, and increase CEO turnover. The bulk of CEO compensation changes in distressed firms derives from the performance‐related part of compensation, consistent with the “shareholder value” view of CEO compensation.